/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_
#define _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_

#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/const.h>
#include <linux/limits.h>

#define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __gnu_inline __overloadable
#define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x)

#define FORTIFY_REASON_DIR(r)		((r) & 1)
#define FORTIFY_REASON_FUNC(r)		((r) >> 1)
#define FORTIFY_REASON(func, write)	((func) << 1 | (write))

/* Overridden by KUnit tests. */
#ifndef fortify_panic
# define fortify_panic(func, write, avail, size, retfail)	\
	 __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write), avail, size)
#endif
#ifndef fortify_warn_once
# define fortify_warn_once(x...)	WARN_ONCE(x)
#endif

#define FORTIFY_READ		 0
#define FORTIFY_WRITE		 1

#define EACH_FORTIFY_FUNC(macro)	\
	macro(strncpy),			\
	macro(strnlen),			\
	macro(strlen),			\
	macro(strscpy),			\
	macro(strlcat),			\
	macro(strcat),			\
	macro(strncat),			\
	macro(memset),			\
	macro(memcpy),			\
	macro(memmove),			\
	macro(memscan),			\
	macro(memcmp),			\
	macro(memchr),			\
	macro(memchr_inv),		\
	macro(kmemdup),			\
	macro(strcpy),			\
	macro(UNKNOWN),

#define MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC(func)	FORTIFY_FUNC_##func

enum fortify_func {
	EACH_FORTIFY_FUNC(MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC)
};

void __fortify_report(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size);
void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size) __cold __noreturn;
void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)");
void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (2nd parameter)");
void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");
void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object (1st parameter)");
void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");

#define __compiletime_strlen(p)					\
({								\
	char *__p = (char *)(p);				\
	size_t __ret = SIZE_MAX;				\
	const size_t __p_size = __member_size(p);		\
	if (__p_size != SIZE_MAX &&				\
	    __builtin_constant_p(*__p)) {			\
		size_t __p_len = __p_size - 1;			\
		if (__builtin_constant_p(__p[__p_len]) &&	\
		    __p[__p_len] == '\0')			\
			__ret = __builtin_strlen(__p);		\
	}							\
	__ret;							\
})

#if defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__)

#if !defined(CONFIG_CC_HAS_KASAN_MEMINTRINSIC_PREFIX) && !defined(CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY)
extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memset);
extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memmove);
extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcpy);
#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)
extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__asan_memset);
extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__asan_memmove);
extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__asan_memcpy);
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__hwasan_memset);
extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__hwasan_memmove);
extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(__hwasan_memcpy);
#endif

extern void *__underlying_memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memchr);
extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp);
extern char *__underlying_strcat(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcat);
extern char *__underlying_strcpy(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcpy);
extern __kernel_size_t __underlying_strlen(const char *p) __RENAME(strlen);
extern char *__underlying_strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) __RENAME(strncat);
extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(strncpy);

#else

#if defined(__SANITIZE_MEMORY__)
/*
 * For KMSAN builds all memcpy/memset/memmove calls should be replaced by the
 * corresponding __msan_XXX functions.
 */
#include <linux/kmsan_string.h>
#define __underlying_memcpy	__msan_memcpy
#define __underlying_memmove	__msan_memmove
#define __underlying_memset	__msan_memset
#else
#define __underlying_memcpy	__builtin_memcpy
#define __underlying_memmove	__builtin_memmove
#define __underlying_memset	__builtin_memset
#endif

#define __underlying_memchr	__builtin_memchr
#define __underlying_memcmp	__builtin_memcmp
#define __underlying_strcat	__builtin_strcat
#define __underlying_strcpy	__builtin_strcpy
#define __underlying_strlen	__builtin_strlen
#define __underlying_strncat	__builtin_strncat
#define __underlying_strncpy	__builtin_strncpy

#endif

/**
 * unsafe_memcpy - memcpy implementation with no FORTIFY bounds checking
 *
 * @dst: Destination memory address to write to
 * @src: Source memory address to read from
 * @bytes: How many bytes to write to @dst from @src
 * @justification: Free-form text or comment describing why the use is needed
 *
 * This should be used for corner cases where the compiler cannot do the
 * right thing, or during transitions between APIs, etc. It should be used
 * very rarely, and includes a place for justification detailing where bounds
 * checking has happened, and why existing solutions cannot be employed.
 */
#define unsafe_memcpy(dst, src, bytes, justification)		\
	__underlying_memcpy(dst, src, bytes)

/*
 * Clang's use of __builtin_*object_size() within inlines needs hinting via
 * __pass_*object_size(). The preference is to only ever use type 1 (member
 * size, rather than struct size), but there remain some stragglers using
 * type 0 that will be converted in the future.
 */
#if __has_builtin(__builtin_dynamic_object_size)
#define POS			__pass_dynamic_object_size(1)
#define POS0			__pass_dynamic_object_size(0)
#else
#define POS			__pass_object_size(1)
#define POS0			__pass_object_size(0)
#endif

#define __compiletime_lessthan(bounds, length)	(	\
	__builtin_constant_p((bounds) < (length)) &&	\
	(bounds) < (length)				\
)

/**
 * strncpy - Copy a string to memory with non-guaranteed NUL padding
 *
 * @p: pointer to destination of copy
 * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to copy
 * @size: bytes to write at @p
 *
 * If strlen(@q) >= @size, the copy of @q will stop after @size bytes,
 * and @p will NOT be NUL-terminated
 *
 * If strlen(@q) < @size, following the copy of @q, trailing NUL bytes
 * will be written to @p until @size total bytes have been written.
 *
 * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
 * over-reads of @q, it cannot defend against writing unterminated
 * results to @p. Using strncpy() remains ambiguous and fragile.
 * Instead, please choose an alternative, so that the expectation
 * of @p's contents is unambiguous:
 *
 * +--------------------+--------------------+------------+
 * | **p** needs to be: | padded to **size** | not padded |
 * +====================+====================+============+
 * |     NUL-terminated | strscpy_pad()      | strscpy()  |
 * +--------------------+--------------------+------------+
 * | not NUL-terminated | strtomem_pad()     | strtomem() |
 * +--------------------+--------------------+------------+
 *
 * Note strscpy*()'s differing return values for detecting truncation,
 * and strtomem*()'s expectation that the destination is marked with
 * __nonstring when it is a character array.
 *
 */
__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strncpy, 1, 2, 3)
char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
{
	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);

	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
		__write_overflow();
	if (p_size < size)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, p);
	return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
}

extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
/**
 * strnlen - Return bounded count of characters in a NUL-terminated string
 *
 * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to count.
 * @maxlen: maximum number of characters to count.
 *
 * Returns number of characters in @p (NOT including the final NUL), or
 * @maxlen, if no NUL has been found up to there.
 *
 */
__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
{
	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
	const size_t p_len = __compiletime_strlen(p);
	size_t ret;

	/* We can take compile-time actions when maxlen is const. */
	if (__builtin_constant_p(maxlen) && p_len != SIZE_MAX) {
		/* If p is const, we can use its compile-time-known len. */
		if (maxlen >= p_size)
			return p_len;
	}

	/* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */
	ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
	if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, ret + 1, ret);
	return ret;
}

/*
 * Defined after fortified strnlen to reuse it. However, it must still be
 * possible for strlen() to be used on compile-time strings for use in
 * static initializers (i.e. as a constant expression).
 */
/**
 * strlen - Return count of characters in a NUL-terminated string
 *
 * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to count.
 *
 * Do not use this function unless the string length is known at
 * compile-time. When @p is unterminated, this function may crash
 * or return unexpected counts that could lead to memory content
 * exposures. Prefer strnlen().
 *
 * Returns number of characters in @p (NOT including the final NUL).
 *
 */
#define strlen(p)							\
	__builtin_choose_expr(__is_constexpr(__builtin_strlen(p)),	\
		__builtin_strlen(p), __fortify_strlen(p))
__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strlen, 1)
__kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p)
{
	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
	__kernel_size_t ret;

	/* Give up if we don't know how large p is. */
	if (p_size == SIZE_MAX)
		return __underlying_strlen(p);
	ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
	if (p_size <= ret)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, ret + 1, ret);
	return ret;
}

/* Defined after fortified strnlen() to reuse it. */
extern ssize_t __real_strscpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(sized_strscpy);
__FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t sized_strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t size)
{
	/* Use string size rather than possible enclosing struct size. */
	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
	const size_t q_size = __member_size(q);
	size_t len;

	/* If we cannot get size of p and q default to call strscpy. */
	if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
		return __real_strscpy(p, q, size);

	/*
	 * If size can be known at compile time and is greater than
	 * p_size, generate a compile time write overflow error.
	 */
	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
		__write_overflow();

	/* Short-circuit for compile-time known-safe lengths. */
	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, SIZE_MAX)) {
		len = __compiletime_strlen(q);

		if (len < SIZE_MAX && __compiletime_lessthan(len, size)) {
			__underlying_memcpy(p, q, len + 1);
			return len;
		}
	}

	/*
	 * This call protects from read overflow, because len will default to q
	 * length if it smaller than size.
	 */
	len = strnlen(q, size);
	/*
	 * If len equals size, we will copy only size bytes which leads to
	 * -E2BIG being returned.
	 * Otherwise we will copy len + 1 because of the final '\O'.
	 */
	len = len == size ? size : len + 1;

	/*
	 * Generate a runtime write overflow error if len is greater than
	 * p_size.
	 */
	if (p_size < len)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, len, -E2BIG);

	/*
	 * We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from:
	 * 1. Read overflow thanks to call to strnlen().
	 * 2. Write overflow thanks to above ifs.
	 */
	return __real_strscpy(p, q, len);
}

/* Defined after fortified strlen() to reuse it. */
extern size_t __real_strlcat(char *p, const char *q, size_t avail) __RENAME(strlcat);
/**
 * strlcat - Append a string to an existing string
 *
 * @p: pointer to %NUL-terminated string to append to
 * @q: pointer to %NUL-terminated string to append from
 * @avail: Maximum bytes available in @p
 *
 * Appends %NUL-terminated string @q after the %NUL-terminated
 * string at @p, but will not write beyond @avail bytes total,
 * potentially truncating the copy from @q. @p will stay
 * %NUL-terminated only if a %NUL already existed within
 * the @avail bytes of @p. If so, the resulting number of
 * bytes copied from @q will be at most "@avail - strlen(@p) - 1".
 *
 * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
 * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the sizes
 * of @p and @q are known to the compiler. Prefer building the
 * string with formatting, via scnprintf(), seq_buf, or similar.
 *
 * Returns total bytes that _would_ have been contained by @p
 * regardless of truncation, similar to snprintf(). If return
 * value is >= @avail, the string has been truncated.
 *
 */
__FORTIFY_INLINE
size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail)
{
	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
	const size_t q_size = __member_size(q);
	size_t p_len, copy_len;
	size_t actual, wanted;

	/* Give up immediately if both buffer sizes are unknown. */
	if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
		return __real_strlcat(p, q, avail);

	p_len = strnlen(p, avail);
	copy_len = strlen(q);
	wanted = actual = p_len + copy_len;

	/* Cannot append any more: report truncation. */
	if (avail <= p_len)
		return wanted;

	/* Give up if string is already overflowed. */
	if (p_size <= p_len)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, p_len + 1, wanted);

	if (actual >= avail) {
		copy_len = avail - p_len - 1;
		actual = p_len + copy_len;
	}

	/* Give up if copy will overflow. */
	if (p_size <= actual)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, actual + 1, wanted);
	__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
	p[actual] = '\0';

	return wanted;
}

/* Defined after fortified strlcat() to reuse it. */
/**
 * strcat - Append a string to an existing string
 *
 * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to append to
 * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to append from
 *
 * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
 * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the
 * destination buffer size is known to the compiler. Prefer
 * building the string with formatting, via scnprintf() or similar.
 * At the very least, use strncat().
 *
 * Returns @p.
 *
 */
__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2)
char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
{
	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
	const size_t wanted = strlcat(p, q, p_size);

	if (p_size <= wanted)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, wanted + 1, p);
	return p;
}

/**
 * strncat - Append a string to an existing string
 *
 * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to append to
 * @q: pointer to source string to append from
 * @count: Maximum bytes to read from @q
 *
 * Appends at most @count bytes from @q (stopping at the first
 * NUL byte) after the NUL-terminated string at @p. @p will be
 * NUL-terminated.
 *
 * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
 * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the sizes
 * of @p and @q are known to the compiler. Prefer building the
 * string with formatting, via scnprintf() or similar.
 *
 * Returns @p.
 *
 */
/* Defined after fortified strlen() and strnlen() to reuse them. */
__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strncat, 1, 2, 3)
char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t count)
{
	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
	const size_t q_size = __member_size(q);
	size_t p_len, copy_len, total;

	if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
		return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count);
	p_len = strlen(p);
	copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
	total = p_len + copy_len + 1;
	if (p_size < total)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, total, p);
	__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
	p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
	return p;
}

__FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
					 const size_t p_size,
					 const size_t p_size_field)
{
	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
		/*
		 * Length argument is a constant expression, so we
		 * can perform compile-time bounds checking where
		 * buffer sizes are also known at compile time.
		 */

		/* Error when size is larger than enclosing struct. */
		if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size_field, p_size) &&
		    __compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
			__write_overflow();

		/* Warn when write size is larger than dest field. */
		if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size_field, size))
			__write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
	}
	/*
	 * At this point, length argument may not be a constant expression,
	 * so run-time bounds checking can be done where buffer sizes are
	 * known. (This is not an "else" because the above checks may only
	 * be compile-time warnings, and we want to still warn for run-time
	 * overflows.)
	 */

	/*
	 * Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the
	 * field, when the buffer's remaining size is known.
	 * (The SIZE_MAX test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
	 * lengths are unknown.)
	 */
	if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, true);
	return false;
}

#define __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, size, p_size, p_size_field) ({	\
	size_t __fortify_size = (size_t)(size);				\
	fortify_memset_chk(__fortify_size, p_size, p_size_field),	\
	__underlying_memset(p, c, __fortify_size);			\
})

/*
 * __struct_size() vs __member_size() must be captured here to avoid
 * evaluating argument side-effects further into the macro layers.
 */
#ifndef CONFIG_KMSAN
#define memset(p, c, s) __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, s,			\
		__struct_size(p), __member_size(p))
#endif

/*
 * To make sure the compiler can enforce protection against buffer overflows,
 * memcpy(), memmove(), and memset() must not be used beyond individual
 * struct members. If you need to copy across multiple members, please use
 * struct_group() to create a named mirror of an anonymous struct union.
 * (e.g. see struct sk_buff.) Read overflow checking is currently only
 * done when a write overflow is also present, or when building with W=1.
 *
 * Mitigation coverage matrix
 *					Bounds checking at:
 *					+-------+-------+-------+-------+
 *					| Compile time  |   Run time    |
 * memcpy() argument sizes:		| write | read  | write | read  |
 *        dest     source   length      +-------+-------+-------+-------+
 * memcpy(known,   known,   constant)	|   y   |   y   |  n/a  |  n/a  |
 * memcpy(known,   unknown, constant)	|   y   |   n   |  n/a  |   V   |
 * memcpy(known,   known,   dynamic)	|   n   |   n   |   B   |   B   |
 * memcpy(known,   unknown, dynamic)	|   n   |   n   |   B   |   V   |
 * memcpy(unknown, known,   constant)	|   n   |   y   |   V   |  n/a  |
 * memcpy(unknown, unknown, constant)	|   n   |   n   |   V   |   V   |
 * memcpy(unknown, known,   dynamic)	|   n   |   n   |   V   |   B   |
 * memcpy(unknown, unknown, dynamic)	|   n   |   n   |   V   |   V   |
 *					+-------+-------+-------+-------+
 *
 * y = perform deterministic compile-time bounds checking
 * n = cannot perform deterministic compile-time bounds checking
 * n/a = no run-time bounds checking needed since compile-time deterministic
 * B = can perform run-time bounds checking (currently unimplemented)
 * V = vulnerable to run-time overflow (will need refactoring to solve)
 *
 */
__FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
					 const size_t p_size,
					 const size_t q_size,
					 const size_t p_size_field,
					 const size_t q_size_field,
					 const u8 func)
{
	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
		/*
		 * Length argument is a constant expression, so we
		 * can perform compile-time bounds checking where
		 * buffer sizes are also known at compile time.
		 */

		/* Error when size is larger than enclosing struct. */
		if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size_field, p_size) &&
		    __compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
			__write_overflow();
		if (__compiletime_lessthan(q_size_field, q_size) &&
		    __compiletime_lessthan(q_size, size))
			__read_overflow2();

		/* Warn when write size argument larger than dest field. */
		if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size_field, size))
			__write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
		/*
		 * Warn for source field over-read when building with W=1
		 * or when an over-write happened, so both can be fixed at
		 * the same time.
		 */
		if ((IS_ENABLED(KBUILD_EXTRA_WARN1) ||
		     __compiletime_lessthan(p_size_field, size)) &&
		    __compiletime_lessthan(q_size_field, size))
			__read_overflow2_field(q_size_field, size);
	}
	/*
	 * At this point, length argument may not be a constant expression,
	 * so run-time bounds checking can be done where buffer sizes are
	 * known. (This is not an "else" because the above checks may only
	 * be compile-time warnings, and we want to still warn for run-time
	 * overflows.)
	 */

	/*
	 * Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the
	 * field, when the buffer's remaining size is known.
	 * (The SIZE_MAX test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
	 * lengths are unknown.)
	 */
	if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size)
		fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, true);
	else if (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size)
		fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ, q_size, size, true);

	/*
	 * Warn when writing beyond destination field size.
	 *
	 * Note the implementation of __builtin_*object_size() behaves
	 * like sizeof() when not directly referencing a flexible
	 * array member, which means there will be many bounds checks
	 * that will appear at run-time, without a way for them to be
	 * detected at compile-time (as can be done when the destination
	 * is specifically the flexible array member).
	 * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=101832
	 */
	if (p_size_field != SIZE_MAX &&
	    p_size != p_size_field && p_size_field < size)
		return true;

	return false;
}

/*
 * To work around what seems to be an optimizer bug, the macro arguments
 * need to have const copies or the values end up changed by the time they
 * reach fortify_warn_once(). See commit 6f7630b1b5bc ("fortify: Capture
 * __bos() results in const temp vars") for more details.
 */
#define __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, size, p_size, q_size,		\
			     p_size_field, q_size_field, op) ({		\
	const size_t __fortify_size = (size_t)(size);			\
	const size_t __p_size = (p_size);				\
	const size_t __q_size = (q_size);				\
	const size_t __p_size_field = (p_size_field);			\
	const size_t __q_size_field = (q_size_field);			\
	/* Keep a mutable version of the size for the final copy. */	\
	size_t __copy_size = __fortify_size;				\
	fortify_warn_once(fortify_memcpy_chk(__fortify_size, __p_size,	\
				     __q_size, __p_size_field,		\
				     __q_size_field, FORTIFY_FUNC_ ##op), \
		  #op ": detected field-spanning write (size %zu) of single %s (size %zu)\n", \
		  __fortify_size,					\
		  "field \"" #p "\" at " FILE_LINE,			\
		  __p_size_field);					\
	/* Hide only the run-time size from value range tracking to */	\
	/* silence compile-time false positive bounds warnings. */	\
	if (!__builtin_constant_p(__copy_size))				\
		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(__copy_size);			\
	__underlying_##op(p, q, __copy_size);				\
})

/*
 * Notes about compile-time buffer size detection:
 *
 * With these types...
 *
 *	struct middle {
 *		u16 a;
 *		u8 middle_buf[16];
 *		int b;
 *	};
 *	struct end {
 *		u16 a;
 *		u8 end_buf[16];
 *	};
 *	struct flex {
 *		int a;
 *		u8 flex_buf[];
 *	};
 *
 *	void func(TYPE *ptr) { ... }
 *
 * Cases where destination size cannot be currently detected:
 * - the size of ptr's object (seemingly by design, gcc & clang fail):
 *	__builtin_object_size(ptr, 1) == SIZE_MAX
 * - the size of flexible arrays in ptr's obj (by design, dynamic size):
 *	__builtin_object_size(ptr->flex_buf, 1) == SIZE_MAX
 * - the size of ANY array at the end of ptr's obj (gcc and clang bug):
 *	__builtin_object_size(ptr->end_buf, 1) == SIZE_MAX
 *	https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=101836
 *
 * Cases where destination size is currently detected:
 * - the size of non-array members within ptr's object:
 *	__builtin_object_size(ptr->a, 1) == 2
 * - the size of non-flexible-array in the middle of ptr's obj:
 *	__builtin_object_size(ptr->middle_buf, 1) == 16
 *
 */

/*
 * __struct_size() vs __member_size() must be captured here to avoid
 * evaluating argument side-effects further into the macro layers.
 */
#define memcpy(p, q, s)  __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s,			\
		__struct_size(p), __struct_size(q),			\
		__member_size(p), __member_size(q),			\
		memcpy)
#define memmove(p, q, s)  __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s,			\
		__struct_size(p), __struct_size(q),			\
		__member_size(p), __member_size(q),			\
		memmove)

extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);
__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
{
	const size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);

	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
		__read_overflow();
	if (p_size < size)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL);
	return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
}

__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_memcmp, 1, 2, 3)
int memcmp(const void * const POS0 p, const void * const POS0 q, __kernel_size_t size)
{
	const size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);
	const size_t q_size = __struct_size(q);

	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
		if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
			__read_overflow();
		if (__compiletime_lessthan(q_size, size))
			__read_overflow2();
	}
	if (p_size < size)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, INT_MIN);
	else if (q_size < size)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, q_size, size, INT_MIN);
	return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
}

__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_memchr, 1, 2, 3)
void *memchr(const void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
{
	const size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);

	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
		__read_overflow();
	if (p_size < size)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL);
	return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);
}

void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);
__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size)
{
	const size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);

	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
		__read_overflow();
	if (p_size < size)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL);
	return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
}

extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup_noprof)
								    __realloc_size(2);
__FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup_noprof(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
{
	const size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);

	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
		__read_overflow();
	if (p_size < size)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size,
			      __real_kmemdup(p, 0, gfp));
	return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
}
#define kmemdup(...)	alloc_hooks(kmemdup_noprof(__VA_ARGS__))

/**
 * strcpy - Copy a string into another string buffer
 *
 * @p: pointer to destination of copy
 * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to copy
 *
 * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
 * overflows, this is only possible when the sizes of @q and @p are
 * known to the compiler. Prefer strscpy(), though note its different
 * return values for detecting truncation.
 *
 * Returns @p.
 *
 */
/* Defined after fortified strlen to reuse it. */
__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcpy, 1, 2)
char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)
{
	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
	const size_t q_size = __member_size(q);
	size_t size;

	/* If neither buffer size is known, immediately give up. */
	if (__builtin_constant_p(p_size) &&
	    __builtin_constant_p(q_size) &&
	    p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
		return __underlying_strcpy(p, q);
	size = strlen(q) + 1;
	/* Compile-time check for const size overflow. */
	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
		__write_overflow();
	/* Run-time check for dynamic size overflow. */
	if (p_size < size)
		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, p);
	__underlying_memcpy(p, q, size);
	return p;
}

/* Don't use these outside the FORITFY_SOURCE implementation */
#undef __underlying_memchr
#undef __underlying_memcmp
#undef __underlying_strcat
#undef __underlying_strcpy
#undef __underlying_strlen
#undef __underlying_strncat
#undef __underlying_strncpy

#undef POS
#undef POS0

#endif /* _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_ */
